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In “Kant and Degrees of Responsibility,” Joe Saunders claims that “Degrees of responsibility are 
important for both our moral and legal practices” (p. 1) and argues that “transcendental idealism 
precludes Kant from vindicating these judgments [about degrees of responsibility]” (p. 11); thus, 
we have reasons to reject Kant’s transcendental idealism.  In this paper, I show how Kant’s 
transcendental idealism can accommodate and provide a metaphysical account for degrees of 
responsibility.  Whether this “vindicates” such judgments depends upon how much one expects a 
philosophical account to do; I defend modesty there while admitting a reasonable desire for 
reflection on how we can and should make such judgments.  Finally, I raise the question of just 
how important judgments of moral responsibility are.  Rather than looking to metaphysics to figure 
out how to vindicate judgments about degrees of responsibility, I suggest we look to the practical 
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Da sprach Adam: “Das Weib, das du mir zugesellt hast, gab mir 
von dem Baum, und ich aß.”  
…Das Weib sprach: “Die Schlange betrog mich, so daß ich aß.” 
      – Genesis 3:11-13 
  
In “Kant and Degrees of Responsibility,” Joe Saunders claims that “Degrees of 
responsibility are important for both our moral and legal practices” (p. 1) and argues that 
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“transcendental idealism precludes Kant from vindicating these judgments [about degrees 
of responsibility]” (p. 11); thus, we have reasons to reject Kant’s transcendental idealism.  
Saunders offers the example of stealing a chicken: 
If you and I both steal a chicken, all other things being equal, we have committed the 
same wrong and should be held equally responsible. However, if we both steal a 
chicken, but someone drugged you beforehand, then I am more responsible for this 
theft than you are. And this responsibility can come in degrees: You could be drugged 
such that you totally lost control of what you were doing, or mostly lost control, or 
partly lost control, and so on. (p. 7) 
He also considers the cases of children, who are less responsible than adults, and those 
with mental illness who suffer unspecified conditions “such that their agency is 
occasionally diminished” (p. 7).  According to Saunders, Kant’s transcendental idealism 
precludes making morally or legally important distinctions in these and similar cases.  In 
this paper, I show how Kant’s transcendental idealism can accommodate and provide a 
metaphysical account for degrees of responsibility.  Whether this counts as “vindicating” 
such judgments depends upon how much one expects a philosophical account to do, and I 
defend modesty in that arena, while also admitting a reasonable desire for more reflection 
on how we can and should make such judgments.  Finally, I raise the question of just how 
important judgments of moral responsibility are.  I suggest that rather than looking to 
metaphysics to figure out how we should vindicate judgments about degrees of 
responsibility, we should look to the practical purposes that such judgments serve.  
Importantly, for the purposes of this paper, I am not going to discuss the legal practices 
associated with degrees of responsibility.  While Kant can make sense of these practices, 
the way his philosophy applies to them will be quite different than the way that it applies to 
moral degrees of responsibility.1 
 
 Before launching into a metaphysical discussion of transcendental idealism, a word 
about Kant’s moral theory.  This theory first and foremost addresses agents deciding what 
moral demands they are beholden to (along with philosophers seeking to make sense of 
that agential standpoint).  Kant says remarkably little about the assessment of choices that 
one has made or about the choices of others.  The categorical imperative is first- or second-
person present, an imperative about what to do in order to be a good will.  It is not a 
criterion for determining whether or not a person has or has had a good will.  From that 
perspective, and I’ll return to this briefly in §3, it’s not clear what role degrees of 
responsibility actually have.  When I am trying to decide what to do, I take myself to be 
responsible; taking myself to be only partly responsible when in the moment of 
deliberation is a corrupt form of making excuses.  In Saunders’s chicken example, if I am 
                                                             
1  Put briefly, Kant’s legal philosophy is based on his Doctrine of Right, where the emphasis is on 
constructing laws that can secure through coercion a system within which individuals’ actions “can coexist 
with the freedom [of action] of each in accordance with a universal law” (6:230).  Individuals’ motives, ends, 
and even maxims are not directly relevant to the rightness of their actions under such a system.  The question 
of legal responsibility involves the extent to which coercive restrictions on actions under certain 
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deciding whether or not take the chicken, and I say to myself something like “Well, I can 
go ahead and take it, because after all, I’ve been drugged and so am not wholly 
responsible,” I am guilty of a sort of excuse-making that no moral theory should help to 
justify.2 
 When it comes to the evaluation of the moral status of individuals, Kant does 
discuss degrees of imputation, and separately recommends that we “throw the veil of 
philanthropy over [others’] faults” (6:228, 466; both cited in Saunders, pp. 8-9, 13), but his 
most sustained philosophical discussion of the ascription of moral status comes in his 
Religion, when he lays out the problem of humans’ radical evil and the fact that we are 
justified in ascribing evil to all human beings, even the best.  In this context, Kant has no 
qualms about inferring moral status from empirically-given conditions, arguing that “the 
multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human deeds parades before us” 
shows universal human evil (6:32-33; for discussion, see Frierson 2013).  He also quite 
clearly is not focused on developing an account of degrees of responsibility.  In fact, he 
strongly resists any “lenient justice” (27: 331) or “anything morally intermediate” (6:22), 
that is, any conceptions of morality that would excuse human beings from recognizing 
their own evil.  Unlike Saunders, who seems quite concerned to ensure that no one is 
blamed too much, Kant recognizes in human beings a natural tendency to make excuses for 
our misbehaviors and thereby blame ourselves far too little.  His aim in the Religion, 
among other things, is to show how we can honestly come to terms with our own 
culpability for our own misdeeds while still holding out hope for moral improvement. 
 Overall, then, Kant just is not particularly concerned with degrees of moral 
responsibility. Partly, this is because he’s just not that concerned with moral evaluation at 
all, focusing his moral theory instead on articulating one’s duties and giving a 
philosophical account of the nature and conditions of possibility of taking oneself to be 
responsible within the practical perspective of deliberation.  And when he does focus on 
moral evaluation, his primary concern is a justification of the claim that human beings are 
universally evil and a vindication of the possibility of moral hope even in the face of that 
claim.  Fortunately, however, Kant’s vindication of this possibility of moral hope provides 
resources for thinking through what a Kantian approach to degrees of responsibility would 
look like.  In the following section, I lay out this Kantian approach, before turning in §2 to 
a discussion of the limits of the approach, and then in §3 to a brief discussion of the actual 
role of judgments about degrees of responsibility in human life. 
 
1. A Metaphysically-Loaded, Transcendental Idealist, Kantian Approach to 
Degrees of Responsibility 
 
In this section, I aim to sketch how a Kantian approach to degrees of responsibility could 
work.  For the purpose of this sketch, I draw on a metaphysically thick reading of 
                                                             
2 One might think that there is room for judgments about moral responsibility when it comes to deliberating 
about how to treat others or how to deal with one’s own misdeeds.  I discuss these cases in §3. 
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transcendental idealism, according to which things in themselves provide the noumenal 
grounds for phenomenally given objects in the world we experience.  More specifically, on 
this reading human beings have an empirical character in the world of sense that is 
grounded in a transcendentally free, noumenal, intelligible character. Even as a 
metaphysical reading, this simplifies lots of issues (e.g. whether there are two worlds or 
two aspects of things, etc.), and in other work of mine (e.g. Frierson 2010), I have argued 
that metaphysically thin, two-standpoint readings of Kant’s transcendental idealism can 
accommodate many of the claims made on behalf of more metaphysical readings.  For the 
purpose of my discussion above, however, the more metaphysically loaded version allows 
for a more concise treatment of the problem.  It is also, fortuitously, more consistent with 
the way that Saunders describes Kant’s transcendental idealism.  As I read it, and I think 
Saunders could agree with this, the Critique of Pure Reason shows, based on the 
conditions of possibility of empirical cognition, that even the most thorough-going natural 
necessity could not fully explain anything in the world of sense.  On this basis, Kant argues 
that the ultimate ground for the empirical characters of things cannot be ascribable to any 
possible object of experience.  This opens room for thinking of transcendentally free 
grounds of events in the world, even while those events in the world proceed in accordance 
with law-like empirical characters.  The Critique of Practical Reason then shows, on the 
basis of the fact of reason – that human beings ought to act in accordance with the moral 
law – that we are such transcendentally free grounds.  Saunders also rightly draws on and 
endorses Eric Watkin’s reading of Kant, according to which “things in themselves ground 
appearances, but appearances do not ground things in themselves” (Watkins 2005:328, 
Saunders p. 5). 3   That is, our law-governed empirical characters are grounded in our 
transcendentally free intelligible characters, but not vice versa.  There is no causal 
influence from the world of experience to the free grounds of that world.4 
 Now let’s throw in some of what Kant adds to this picture in Religion.  There Kant 
develops a more detailed model of how humans’ intelligible character grounds our actions 
                                                             
3 At times, Saunders is a bit imprecise in the way he puts this idealism, however.  Thus he says, for instance, 
that “every action is either in the world of sense, and thus entirely determined; or outside the world of sense, 
and accordingly entirely free from such empirical conditions” (p. 6).  But for Kant, every action is in the 
world of sense and thus determined in accordance with natural laws; there’s no either-or about this.  And 
every action for which one is morally responsibility is entirely free from empirical conditions.  As he puts it 
in the first Critique, the “only” question here is “whether it is a correct disjunctive proposition that every 
effect in the world must arise either from nature or from freedom, or whether instead both … might be able 
to take place simultaneously in the same occurrence” (A536/B564).  For Kant, all morally-ascribable actions 
are both determined in accordance with natural laws and entirely ascribable to undetermined free agents.  
This sounds like an impossible combination, which is why Kant had to write two Critiques laying out how it 
can be possible. 
 I should also note that while I accept Saunders’s claim that Kant seeks to reconcile libertarian 
freedom with strict determinism in the world, some recent Kantians have sought an account of transcendental 
idealism according to which transcendental freedom precludes strict determinism in the world of experience.  
Lucy Allais hints at such a view in Allais 2015 and has discussed it with me in conversation.  I suspect that 
she would reject Saunders’s claim that Laplace’s demon “helps bring out the distinctive nature of Kant’s 
position” (p. 1) and would support a libertarian conception along the lines of Steward 2012 (see Saunders, p. 
20, note 43) but would see this as a genuinely Kantian position.  
4  Elsewhere, I’ve emphasized this point in terms of the “asymmetry in Kant’s conception of freedom” 
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in the world.  Consistent with his long-standing claim that we hold people responsible for 
the maxims of their deeds, and not mere deeds, he claims that intelligible character grounds 
actions in accordance with maxims.  As in the Critique of Practical Reason, he explains 
that ultimately, our maxims are traceable to a fundamental principle, either of self-love or 
of respect for the moral law.  He adds that all human beings incorporate both self-love and 
respect for the moral law into the most basic maxims of their intelligible characters; the 
key difference between good and evil, the difference we must ascribe to transcendental 
freedom in order to make sense of moral responsibility, is the difference between 
subordinating morality to self-love or vice versa.  That is, one is good insofar as one 
prioritizes the moral law and pursues self-love only within the constraints of morality; one 
is evil insofar as prioritizes self-love and obeys the moral law only when the cost to oneself 
is not too high.   
Integrating this account of good and evil with Kant’s metaphysical picture, we can 
say that although human intelligible character, as a thing-in-itself, is inscrutable to 
theoretical reason, practical reason allows us to rationally justify the claim that human 
intelligible character is characterized by one of these two fundamental maxims (either self-
love over morality or morality over self-love).  These fundamental maxims cannot be 
directly experienced, but they show up in the world as empirically-given patterns of 
choices and actions that are determined in accordance with natural laws.  Thus for any 
given action, we can trace the empirical causes of that action, proceeding “as with any 
investigation in the series of determining causes for a given natural effect” (A 554/B 582), 
such as “for a lunar or solar eclipse” (5:99).  In addition, we can consider the action 
morally, tracing it to one or the other fundamental moral maxim. 
Two important points here will set the stage for understanding how all this helps 
with degrees of moral responsibility.  First, Kant’s argument for transcendental freedom is 
based on the fact that such freedom is a condition of the possibility of moral obligation or 
moral responsibility.  That means that he has a basis for believing in a transcendentally free 
ground of our empirical character insofar as we hold one another responsible for that 
empirical character.  I generally do not hold myself or others responsible for their hair 
color.  There is thus no reason to ascribe hair color to a transcendentally free intelligible 
character.  However, were my friend to dye her hair Home Depot orange, I would hold her 
at least partly responsible for its color.  Importantly, even in that case, there is much that I 
would not hold her responsible for.  She’s not responsible for the fact that her hair can be 
dyed, or (at least directly) for the range of colors available to her, or even (importantly) for 
the particular color that attracted her fancy.  But she’s responsible for taking her desire 
(however generated) for a different hair color as a sufficient reason – along with whatever 
else she took into account – for taking this action.  If she colored her hair merely at the 
behest of Home Depot as a form of advertising, she may even be morally culpable (see 
6:423).  In short, for Kant, one is responsible only for the maxim of one’s action, and only 
for the form of that maxim.  One is responsible for whether one makes self-love or duty the 
ultimate basis of maxim endorsement.   
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And now we come to a second crucial point, the fact of humans’ radical evil.  This 
one is more complicated, and could easily become a long tangent, so I’ll try to focus only 
on the basic outline of the story. 5   According to Kant, for most actions looked at in 
isolation, not only will tracing the empirically determining causes be tricky business, but it 
is literally impossible to determine which of the two fundamental maxims is the action’s 
ultimate ground.  Any action that could follow from a morally good maxim could also 
follow from a maxim that prioritizes self-love, since one can do good things for bad 
reasons or because the personal costs of doing them are sufficiently low.  However, this 
inscrutability of underlying moral maxims applies only to most actions; there are some 
actions that cannot proceed from morally good maxims – actions that directly violate laws 
of right, for instance – so in those cases, we can know that the action is grounded in an evil 
maxim.  (For now, I’m bracketing issues about degrees of responsibility, but we’ll get 
there.)  Moreover, Kant is a rigorist of a particularly extreme sort when it comes to 
obedience to the moral law; there is no “middle ground” and “even a single” evil action is 
sufficient to know that one’s underlying maxim is evil (6:20).  Thus it seems like each 
human being must have either a good will that would express itself in a life of moral 
perfection or an evil will that would express itself in a life that compromises duty for the 
sake of inclination, at least sometimes.6  Neither of these intelligible characters would be 
affected by the empirical world.  The will that subordinates the moral law to self-love 
would be the noumenal ground of an empirical character that takes the form of a 
temporally-situated willingness to do what’s wrong for the sake of satisfying this or that 
given sensuous (empirical) incentive.  These sensuous incentives have no causal influence 
on the intelligible character; they affect only the way that character shows up in the 
empirical world.  On this account, when we hold someone responsible for their malicious 
lie, what we are really holding them responsible for is a character by virtue of which they 
are willing to do what is wrong for the sake of benefit.  That character is due to 
transcendental freedom.  The particular way that it manifests itself in this particular case is 
due to circumstance.7 
So now we get to what I take to be the central problematic of the Religion.  Kant 
shows that human beings universally act in ways that express evil in the fundamental 
maxims of their wills.  This proof of evil in human nature sets the backdrop for Kant’s 
                                                             
5  For more, see Frierson, 2003: 95-135 and Frierson, 2013: 72-89. 
6 Neither of these wills would be a “holy will” that is untempted by duty; even a perfect will would be a will 
that always subordinates non-moral incentives to moral ones, not a will that has no non-moral incentives.   
7 Again, this is a pretty metaphysically loaded way of putting this situation.  In two-standpoint terms, what 
we would say is that from the standpoint of deliberation, one needn’t take oneself to be responsible for every 
specific detail of one’s choice situation – say, for the fact that one’s inclination is particularly strong, or that 
it’s really easy to get away with in this particular case.  What one is responsible for is the way in which one 
weights those various factors, for one’s ultimate values and their relative priorities.  That I feel a really strong 
desire for chicken can be a reason to steal a chicken, insofar I consider really strong desires sufficient bases 
for violations of right.  But that I feel a really strong desire for a chicken cannot, on a Kantian picture, be a 
sufficient basis for considering really strong desires to be sufficient bases for violations of right.  And what I 
should hold myself responsible for is my choice-architecture, the bases on which I ascribe value, not the 
particular circumstances in which I apply that choice-architecture.  In that sense, I am strictly speaking 
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project in Religion, which is to articulate a sense of “good will” that could apply to human 
beings who have good evidence that they are evil.  To make a long story short,8 I take it 
that Kant replaces a two-fold conception of the options for humans’ intelligible characters 
with a wider range of possible options.  Instead of humans being either morally perfect or 
morally evil, he allows that a person can be in “revolution” against the evil in her own will.  
The language of revolution is temporal, which cannot strictly apply to the intelligible will 
(since that intelligible will cannot be understood with reference to the intuition of time).  
Kant uses the term “revolution” primarily to indicate that such a will involves evil – since 
that’s what it is revolting against – but is fundamentally good – since it’s in revolution 
against evil – and this overall structure, because noumenal, should not be understood as 
partly one way and partly another or as gradually transitioning from one sort of will to 
another.  The idea is that we can have a moral status that is essentially good but that is 
consistent with at least some evil deeds (e.g., deeds contrary to right) in its empirical 
expression.   
So what would such a will look like?  That is, if one’s intelligible character is “in 
revolution against evil,” what is one’s empirical character like?  Kant claims that such an 
intelligible character would be expressed in the empirical world as a will that does and has 
done evil, but that is constantly struggling against its own evil tendencies and making 
progress in that struggle.  Crucially, however, this empirical struggle must – to be 
consistent with Kant’s transcendental idealism – be seen as the expression of an underlying 
noumenal ground.  One’s will-in-revolution grounds one’s life of struggle and moral 
improvement, and not vice versa. 
There’s a lot more to spell out about this complex picture, and it raises various 
problems of its own, but I want to focus here on how it can help with degrees of 
responsibility in Kant.  In the context of the problem of human evil, Kant develops an 
overall model that looks something like this.  At the intelligible level, human beings could, 
in principle, have a will that is one of the following: 
(1) Simply good (prioritizing duty over self-love)   
(2) Simply evil (prioritizing self-love over duty)  
OR 
(3) Good by virtue of a revolution (resisting, for the sake of duty, one’s own 
tendency to prioritize self-love over duty) 
These wills look different in the ways that they appear in the world, at least in some cases.  
While no empirical evidence fully justifies ascribing (2) or (3) to an individual, there is 
sufficient evidence to know that no actual human beings are simply good (1).  Thus a 
morally good human life is a life that expresses a will of the third type, and this manifests 
itself in a life of constant struggle against evil.  But then Kant makes the picture even more 
complicated, by suggesting that there are actually different sorts of evil, and consequently 
different sorts of revolution against evil.  He describes three sorts (laid out in Saunders’s 
paper on pp. 18-19): frail, impure, and depraved wills.  In  his Metaphysics of Morals 
                                                             
8 For longer versions of the story, see Frierson 2003 and Frierson 2013. 
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(6:407-8) and Anthropology (7:251f.), Kant adds yet another sort of “properly evil” will, 
one that is governed by passion, and he adds a way in which human bodies can be moved 
that is “merely a lack of virtue” and not properly a form of “will” at all, namely “affects”.9 
Saunders rightly (in my view) sees these forms of evil as noumenal statuses of the 
will, ascribable to transcendental freedom.  He also rightly claims that “we do not 
experience transcendental freedom” (p. 19), but he then wrongly infers that “we cannot 
know whether someone acted out of frailty, impurity, or wickedness” (p. 19).  In a strict 
sense, of course, this is correct.   We cannot know anything in the moral realm, not even 
that we are transcendentally free; this is a matter for Glaube, not Wissen.  But just as we 
can have good empirical evidence, in some cases, that human beings are evil, so too we 
can have good empirical evidence that they are evil of one sort or another.  And even when 
our evidence is shakier, we can assemble enough evidence to make reasonably good 
assessments.  When a person day after day resolves to wake up earlier the next morning 
and never does so (Kant’s example, see 25:631), it is quite reasonable to see this as frailty, 
and quite hard to see it as depravity (particularly if one is considering oneself).  When over 
a period of decades someone systematically deceives their customers about the safety of 
their products, destroys evidence of that deception, and sets up money laundering 
operations to allow themselves to enjoy the fruits of their spoils without suspicion, it is 
implausible to ascribe this entirely10 to anything short of depravity.  But the epistemic 
point is, to some extent, beside the point, for reasons that we’ll get to soon (in §2).   
 What is central here is that Kant has a metaphysical picture that can make room for 
different kinds of responsibility for one’s actions.  With the exception of affects, all of 
these forms of evil are aspects of intelligible character for which one is responsible; in that 
sense, there are not properly “degrees of responsibility” here.  But there are quite different 
kinds of responsibility.  In every case, what one is responsible for – as noted above – is not 
the particular deeds one performs, but the structure of one’s volition, the way that one 
makes use of what is given to one in order to decide what to do, and different volitional 
structures imply different sorts of responsibility.   
To see more clearly the different ways that we can hold individuals responsible, 
let’s compare depraved and frail chicken-thieves.  (Stealing a chicken is a good example 
because, assuming that one knows that one is stealing a chicken, this action violates strict 
right, so indicates evil.) Someone who is depraved consistently prioritizes self-love over 
the moral law.  Such a person will typically behave quite well, either because of 
inclinations that tend towards good behavior or because of a social structure that promotes 
good behavior, or both.  For a depraved person to steal a chicken, she would need to have 
desires that stealing a chicken could satisfy, and she would need to think that she can get 
away with stealing it without more trouble than it is worth.  If we have reasons to think that 
the chicken-stealing was due to depravity – say, evidence of premeditation – then we hold 
the thief responsible for consistently and deliberately putting self-love ahead of the moral 
                                                             
9 For extensive discussion of affects and passions, albeit from the standpoint of empirical psychology, see 
Frierson 2014: 215-58. 
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law.   The frail person who steals a chicken, by contrast, prioritizes the moral law over self-
love in “the maxim of [his] power of choice,” but this maxim “is subjectively … the 
weaker” when it comes time to act (6:29).  This person commits himself to doing what is 
right and obeying the law, but in a particular case – say, when starving, or when faced with 
peer pressure – fails to follow through on his commitment.  We do not hold the frail person 
responsible for deliberately – or at least not consistently and deliberately – putting self-
love ahead of the moral law.  But we do hold the frail person responsible for not holding 
himself together, for not remaining true to his commitments.  And this is precisely what we 
do not hold the depraved person responsible for.  Both thieves are moral failures, but in 
different ways.  
I have focused on contrasting two extreme cases, but Kant allows for a much wider 
range of variation.  One can be depraved or frail with respect to different inclinations, or in 
different sorts of circumstances.  Someone who would starve to death rather than steal a 
chicken might steal it to avoid being laughed at or to get vengeance on an enemy.  
Someone who is strong-willed under ordinary pressure might be frail when the pressure is 
sufficiently strong (say, literally starving).  Someone who is depraved but cowardly might 
never steal a chicken but might manipulate others to take the risk for her.  And so on.  
These would be qualitatively different sorts of evil.  In some cases, such as those who are 
frail only under pressures of certain degrees, we might even be able to quantify the 
differences.  Kant himself calls frailty, impurity, and depravity three different “grades” of 
evil.  Thus there is considerable room here for what we might call “degrees” of 
responsibility.  The depraved chicken-thief could be called “more” responsible that the 
frail one, the frail thief who succumbs to ordinary peer pressure more responsible that the 
frail one who succumbs to torture, and so on.11   To that extent, Kant can make sense of 
degrees of responsibility language, though his moral theory is more conducive to what in 
my view is a more plausible account, that there are different kinds of responsibility.  In 
place of (or, if you like, in addition to) a thin and quantitative scale, we get a rich set of 
thick responsibility-ascriptions. 
Crucially, every case of the ascription of responsibility is an inference, generally 
imperfect, from given empirical evidence to a description of an empirical character, and 
from that description to an intrinsically imperfect inference about the noumenal ground 
that underlies the empirical character.  Late one night, I catch Manny – who is usually an 
excellent neighbor – with my chicken in his hands, jumping the fence from my chicken 
coop.  He immediately gives back the chicken and sobs, confessing that he stole it.  He 
can’t, or won’t, explain why he did so, until gradually I pry from him that he was up late 
drinking with my consistently troublesome neighbor George, who always has this or that 
excuse for doing whatever brings him benefit, and who tends to draw others into his 
trouble-making.  Manny immediately takes responsibility for what he did and offers to 
make whatever amends he can.  He says that he’s never done anything like this before – a 
                                                             
11  This implies – pace Saunders – that Kant’s model can quite easily “allow for degrees of responsibility 
within these three different failings” (p. 19).  
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claim I confirm later – and promises never to do it again.  What sort of empirical character 
does this display?  On the basis of only a single incident, it’s generally going to be hard to 
draw conclusions about a person’s overall empirical character, but based on the facts as 
I’ve described them here, this sounds more like a case of frailty than of depravity.  The 
presence of alcohol suggests that it might even be a particularly mild case of frailty; 
Manny might have resisted the peer pressure under other circumstances, but he was under 
the influence, and that probably affected things. 
Kant likely would hold Manny responsible for stealing the chicken.  Kant does not 
take frailty to excuse bad behavior; he ascribes frailty to one’s intelligible character.  Given 
that we hold ourselves (and others) responsible for failing to follow through on our 
commitments,12 such failures must be due to transcendental freedom.  In the particular case 
above, his willingness to so easily go along with a bad influence (both with respect to the 
drinking and the stealing) is ascribable to him, and his remorse is a partial indication that 
he recognizes this responsibility.  But his evil is an evil of the “not-sufficiently-committed-
to-good-to-be-consistent” variety, not the “subordinating-good-to-happiness” variety (nor 
the impure “not-sufficiently-committed-to-good-to-be-good-without-some-other-reason” 
variety).  Moreover, what Manny is morally13 responsible for is not, strictly speaking, 
stealing my chicken.  He is responsible for having a frail character of a certain type.  The 
fact that he stole my chicken is partly based on that frail character, but also partly based on 
the character of my neighbor, on the circumstances, the inclinations at play, the effects 
alcohol has on his inclinations, and so on.  Manny isn’t responsible at all for most of those 
things, and for others (e.g. the alcohol) he is only indirectly responsible.   
We could considerably enrich this picture by adding the other forms of evil – 
impurity, and passion – or other details.14  But only one additional point is necessary 
before starting to wrap up this section.  For Kant, any good human being is good by virtue 
of being in a struggle against evil.  And this notion of struggle introduces another 
dimension on which we can “rank” different levels of “responsibility.”  The importance of 
struggle is already evident in Kant’s consideration of the three degrees of evil. One who is 
depraved is further from good than one who is impure or frail.  Someone whose life used to 
show evidence of unmitigated preference of self over duty (depravity) but who 
increasingly shows evidence of a commitment to duty that requires the support of 
additional incentives (impurity) is, on the whole, improving.  Such a life, as a whole, 
reflects a will “in revolution” against evil.  More importantly for the present topic, the 
circumstances of one’s actions can affect the reasonableness of thinking that a person is 
making progress against evil.  Take Hu, who grew up in the worst of circumstances, 
surrounded by vice on all sides, and is drugged by friends and taunted into crime, and then 
                                                             
12 This also implies that if we come to think that there are good reasons for not holding ourselves and others 
responsible for frailty, we would thereby have good reasons to think that frail behavior is not ascribable to 
our transcendental freedom.  See §2. 
13 Here the distinction between moral and legal responsibility is crucial. Legally, Manny is responsible for 
stealing my property.  That it’s a chicken doesn’t matter, but it also doesn’t matter what sort of motives or 
frailty he had. 
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steals a chicken; we can infer almost nothing about her moral status from the theft.  For all 
we know, she is well on her way towards a life of virtue.  Since none of us are morally 
perfect and all are at best struggling against our own evil, evidence of evil cannot be the 
final word; what we look for is struggle and improvement.  That Hu caved under this much 
pressure, given where she started, is no sign that she is not improving.  But for Li, who was 
raised in a family that emphasized virtue, cultivated with good habits and sympathy for 
others, taught the rewards of justice and doing one’s duty, and who is now free of any 
material needs that a chicken could satisfy, a deliberate plot to steal a chicken simply to 
cause harm to a neighbor would be a strong – albeit not decisive – sign that he is not 
struggling against his evil tendencies.  We can never know for sure, about any human 
being, whether they are making progress in virtue or not, but the fact that a human good 
will expresses itself as such progress provides for many ways of distinguishing degrees of 
moral responsibility. 
In principle, there also might be cases in which Manny (or Hu, or Li) would not be 
responsible at all, even when he or she was the one with the chicken in his or her hands.  
The most important of these cases, for Kant, are the cases of “affects” and of very young 
children.  Affects, for Kant, are cases where empirically-induced feelings override one’s 
ordinary deliberative capacities to generate behavior that is not controlled by a person’s 
will.  Extreme cases of drunkenness might fall into this category, but Kant’s more common 
examples are shock or momentary flashes of rage.  In these cases, one is not directly 
responsible at all.  Metaphysically, these would be instances of bodily movement, 
motivated by sub-rational mental states, that would not be ascribed to one’s 
transcendentally free intelligible character.  Just as one does not ascribe one’s hair color or 
heartbeat to one’s transcendentally free intelligible character, so too one does not ascribe to 
one’s transcendentally free intelligible character the “acts” of lashing out in a momentary 
burst of uncontrollable anger or remaining frozen in shock as one’s child drowns in a 
frozen lake.15  In the cases of very young children (younger than 8-10), Kant does not think 
that the predisposition to personality – by which we are aware of the binding force of the 
moral law – has yet been awakened.  Such children’s actions are not ascribable to their 
transcendentally free wills. 
How far can Kant’s overall model go?  The metaphysical account here implies that 
insofar as behavior is part of an empirical character that has as its noumenal ground a 
transcendentally free actor, that actor can be held responsible for those actions.  Anything 
empirical that does not have such a ground – hair color, inclinations, reflex actions, affects 
– is not ascribable to a responsible agent.  In any given situation, human beings are 
responsible only for the morally relevant features of their actions, not for the circumstantial 
features that contribute to the action (including the relevant inclinations).  Moreover, they 
are responsible only when mature (older than eight or ten years old) and when not 
                                                             
15  One might well be held indirectly responsible for one’s affects.  If I have a problem with outbursts of 
anger and do nothing to rid myself of tendencies to affect, I am responsible for my failure to rid myself of 
those tendencies. 
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governed by affects.  While one is ultimately either responsible or not, one can be 
responsible for moral features of one’s actions in different ways, ranging from 
responsibility for bad maxims of choice to responsibility for insufficient self-control.  One 
can be responsible to different degrees, insofar as frailty in the face of torture is “less” frail 
than frailty in the face of a slight inclination, or willingness to sacrifice duty for the sake of 
one’s life is less depraved than willingness to sacrifice duty for the sake of an extra packet 
of sweetener in one’s tea.  Moreover, moral failings for which one is responsible can 
reflect upon one’s ultimate moral status differently depending upon the conditions from 
which one started and in which one finds oneself.  For human beings, a good will is a will 
struggling against its own evil tendencies, and similar actions can reflect different degrees 
of that struggle in different people. 
 
2. Common Sense, Philosophy, and Degrees of Responsibility  
 
In §1, my goal was to elucidate a Kantian metaphysics for degrees of responsibility.  This 
elucidation shows that Kant’s transcendental idealism is not inconsistent with a 
considerable range of judgments about degrees of responsibility.  Even if Kant is correct 
that human beings are transcendentally free in their intelligible characters but causally 
determined in their empirical characters, he can give an account of what it means to say, 
for instance, that someone who is drugged is “less responsible” than someone who is not, 
because they are responsible at most16 for frailty in the face of physiological manipulation.  
But Saunders often asks for more than merely a metaphysics that is consistent with 
judgments about degrees of responsibility.  He repeatedly claims that Kant’s metaphysics 
cannot “vindicate” such judgments (pp. 2, 9, 10n27, 11-12, 13, 18, 19).  So I want to spend 
a little time in this section thinking about just what we should expect from metaphysics in 
particular and philosophy in general when it comes to judgments about degrees of 
responsibility.   
Let’s start with where the account in §1 succeeds at vindicating judgments about 
degrees of responsibility.  At times, Saunders seems to mean by “vindicate” what I claim 
to have provided above.  When he says that “the very notion of diminished agency seems 
to conflict with Kant’s claim that every human action is either entirely determined or 
entirely free” (7), it sounds like any Kantian metaphysical account according to which one 
could say that there is a difference between being responsible for deliberately choosing 
profitable vice over duty (depravity) and being responsible for failing to exercise complete 
self-control in the face of temptation (frailty) would be sufficient to answer his charge.  In 
that sense, I have “vindicated” Kant in §1.  By showing how Kant’s metaphysics is 
consistent with differences in the ways people are responsible for particular behaviors, I 
have shown how there could be something like degrees of responsibility even given Kant’s 
metaphysics. 
                                                             
16  Here I’m assuming that the drugging does not completely bypass their deliberative capacities.  If it does 
that, then they are simply not responsible, and their actions are no more ascribable to their intelligible 
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But Saunders often seems to want philosophy to do more than this.  For one thing, 
he often implies something epistemic, that Kant’s metaphysics should justify not only the 
claim that there can be differences in moral responsibility, but also the claim that we can 
know how responsible someone is (e.g. p. 8).  Here Saunders is partly overreading Kant’s 
inscrutability claims and partly overstating how capable we actually are of making these 
sorts of judgments.  Kant is consistent that we cannot have theoretical knowledge of the 
moral status of individuals, including whether or not they are transcendentally free or to 
what extent they are responsible.  What we have in these cases is practical cognition, 
rationally justified “belief.”  Given the fact of reason, we can have complete rational 
certainty that human agents, beholden to the moral law, are transcendentally free.  We can 
also be sure, given the “multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human deeds 
parades before us” (6:32), that human beings are evil.  About the specific moral status of 
any individual, including what sorts of evil he is susceptible to, whether or not he is 
struggling against that evil in ways reflective of a will in revolution, and (therefore) what 
degrees of responsibility he has for particular deeds, we cannot be certain.  We can, 
however, have good evidence one way or another: “human beings … can assess 
themselves and the strength of their maxims … by the upper hand they gain over the senses 
in time, … an ever-continuing striving for the better” (6:48).  This evidence will never be 
perfect.  Manny’s sobbing might have been a particularly sophisticated manipulation to 
avoid punishment, Hu might have taken a deliberate first step in a long term decline into 
worse and worse depravity, and Li might be acting out in a first step towards overcoming 
deep-seated but previously hidden wicked maxims.  But those epistemic limitations when 
it comes to the evaluation of others are just real facts about our human condition.  Not all 
fourteen year olds are less responsible than adults (to use Saunders’s example, p. 7), and 
it’s not always easy to tell when they are.  Ascriptions of degrees of responsibility are 
judgment calls.   
Saunders also wants philosophy to do more in the way of vindication in another 
respect; he often seems to want philosophy to justify our judgments of degrees of 
responsibility.  Thus when he criticizes my claim that “the method for determining what 
the appropriate markers are starts with common-sense moral judgements about 
responsibility” (Frierson 2012:186, quoted on p. 11), he says, “However, this is not a 
solution – it is the very problem at hand. The problem is that transcendental idealism 
precludes Kant from vindicating these judgements in the first place” (p. 11).  When 
criticizing Korsgaard’s view, he asks, “From the practical standpoint, how can we 
distinguish between a person and a toddler?  It is not enough to say, ‘we just do’.  This 
sidesteps the important issue of how Kant can vindicate these practices.” (p. 12).  If 
“vindicate” just means “give a metaphysics consistent with,” then Kant can vindicate these 
practices; toddlers’ empirical characters are not grounded in transcendentally free 
intelligible characters, while those of adults are.  It seems that what Saunders really wants 
here is a transcendental idealism that will show that X or Y markers of moral responsibility 
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are the correct ones, and that X or Y practices of holding people responsible in degrees are 
justified. 
I understand why Saunders wants this.  It seems, intuitively, like the issue of moral 
responsibility should have a metaphysical ground.  It seems like in order to know whether 
or not someone is responsible, we should need first to figure out some metaphysical (and 
probably also psychological) facts about the relationship between that person and the 
action at issue, and then make a philosophically grounded inference from those facts to 
ascription of responsibility.  It seems like metaphysics should come first, and practical 
philosophy should follow as a consequence of what we discover.  But that’s not Kant’s 
view.  For Kant, the “primacy of the practical” implies precisely that in a whole sphere of 
metaphysics – the traditional problems of freedom, immortality, and God – practical 
reasoning comes first, and we draw metaphysical conclusions by considering the 
conditions of possibility of practical claims.  At least in the Critique of Practical Reason, 
Kant argues from the fact that human beings are obligated by categorical imperatives to the 
fact that we are free.  He argues from the fact that we ought to promote the highest good to 
the fact that such promotion is possible (and therefore that we are immortal and there is a 
God).  His metaphysics does not prove his practical philosophy.  Proving that we are 
immortal does not prove that we have an obligation to become perfectly virtuous.  Rather, 
the claim that we have an obligation to become perfectly virtuous proves the metaphysical 
claim.  But the metaphysics “vindicates” the practical philosophy in a weaker sense.  It 
shows that there are possible conditions of possibility of the practical claims we are bound 
to make.  That is, it shows that those (necessary) moral claims are not impossible; there is a 
metaphysics that can support – in the sense of being consistent with – them. 
As I read him, Kant starts both his theoretical philosophy (in the first Critique) and 
his practical philosophy (in the Groundwork but especially in the second Critique) from 
common sense claims (cf. Ameriks, 2000).  In the first Critique, he takes for granted that 
we have experiences of ordinary empirical objects and that we legitimately make a priori 
synthetic judgments in mathematics and natural science, and he develops a metaphysics 
that shows how it’s possible for us to do that.  In the second Critique, he takes for granted 
that we have moral obligations, and he develops a metaphysics that shows how this is 
possible.  Combined, the two Critiques show how the common sense claims about the 
empirical world are consistent with common sense claims about morality, and in particular 
how the causal determinism that is a condition of possibility of the practice of natural 
sciences and even ordinary temporal experiences of objects is consistent with the 
transcendental freedom that is a condition of possibility of morality.  But all of this 
“vindicates” common sense not by providing a foundational proof that various common 
sense practices are correct but by laying out a metaphysical picture according to which 
they are not necessarily impossible.  
What I’ve defended in §1 is a vindication of this sort.  I’ve shown that Kant’s 
metaphysics allows for distinguishing different sorts of intelligible characters based on the 
sorts of evil to which they are committed or against which they are struggling, and I’ve 
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responsibility.  But these claims about different sorts of radical evil, and particularly the 
claim that they map onto different degrees of responsibility, depend upon rather than 
independently prove the relevant common sense judgments about such responsibility.  This 
dependence is clearest in the cases where we do not ascribe responsibility at all.  Toddlers 
and those in momentary fits of rage are not treated as morally responsible for their actions, 
and so we do not ascribe those actions to their intelligible character.  We do not first find a 
metaphysical basis for not ascribing the actions to their intelligible character and then infer 
that they are not responsible.  If that’s what Saunders wants in the way of vindication, he’s 
not going to get it from Kant’s philosophy. 
The reason he’s not going to get that from Kant is one to which I drew attention in 
the article of mine with which Saunders engages most.  For Kant, philosophers in general 
and metaphysicians in particular are very good at certain highly refined sorts of reflection, 
and they can have important roles to play in coming to better understand how various 
commitments fit together into a coherent whole.  In morals, philosophers can even help 
combat tendencies to self-deception that are pervasive in ordinary life and that drive people 
to mitigate the demands of the moral law on themselves.  But, as Jeanine Grenberg aptly 
emphasizes in the title of her book, Kant’s philosophy as a whole, and his moral 
philosophy in particular, is a “Defense of Common Moral Experience” (Grenberg, 2013).  
Kant starts with common sense and shows how it could possibly be true; he defends it 
against any “reasonable doubt” about it.  He’s not trying to prove it afresh. 
 
3. Why do we need degrees of responsibility? 
 
I want to end here in a similar place to where I ended in the 2012 article to which Saunders 
responds, but say a bit more about how we might move forward, in the context of degrees 
of responsibility.  In that 2012 article, I pointed out that “Kant’s philosophy needs to be 
supplemented with an account of how one can arbitrate between competing common sense 
views of moral responsibility” (Frierson, 2012: 482). Since Kant doesn’t do the common 
sense work for us, and he doesn’t replace common sense with metaphysics, we need to 
think about how we might refine our understanding of degrees of responsibility given 
Kant’s overall metaphysical vindication (in my sense of vindication) of them.   
It’s important to start here with three fairly obvious but very important and deeply 
Kantian points about degrees of responsibility.  First, as Saunders recognizes in his own 
article, many ascriptions of degrees of responsibility are not difficult in ordinary life.  
While there may be “hard borderline cases,” there are plenty of “clear case[s] of someone 
having more or less … responsibility” (p. 7), such as the differences between adults and 
children, those under the influence of mind or mood altering drugs and those not under 
such influences, and those with certain sorts of mental illnesses.  Insofar as there are 
straightforward common sense views about degrees of moral responsibility, we can 
legitimately use Kant’s metaphysical views about the nature of human freedom in order to 
make sense of – and thereby “vindicate” in a weak sense – those common sense views.   
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Second, while there are some tough cases – as Saunders notes, “judges and juries navigate 
a difficult terrain” – the difficulties in these cases are typically not metaphysical or even 
ethical but much narrower and less philosophically interesting.  We need to know not 
whether, for instance, being drugged is relevant to responsibility, but about whether and to 
what extent and with what effects a person really was drugged.  We need to know not 
whether it matters that she used that insulting term without intending to offend but whether 
(and how, and to what degree) she understood that it was insulting.  These can be 
genuinely hard issues to figure out in particular cases, but nothing about transcendental 
idealism will make them harder (or easier).  Finally, a point Saunders wholly ignores, it’s 
important to acknowledge that many judgments about degrees of responsibility are used – 
illegitimately – in self-exculpatory ways: “we like to flatter ourselves by falsely attributing 
to ourselves a nobler motive” (4:407).  Even at a common sense level, we can diagnose 
that self-exculpation is a moral problem, and we can be suspicious of demanding too much 
in the way of a philosophical justification of excuses for one’s own bad behavior. 
 Still, however, we may need some ways of thinking about when judgments about 
degrees of responsibility are legitimate, in cases where the relevant empirical facts are 
clear but the consequences for degrees of responsibility are not.  And Kant’s metaphysics 
cuts off at least one natural way of drawing this line.  It can’t be the case that our degree of 
responsibility corresponds to the extent to which our action is determined by causal laws of 
nature.  Since every action is determined in accordance with causal laws of nature, such a 
rule for drawing the line would absolve everyone of responsibility for everything they do.17  
And while we can legitimately say that we are responsible for all and only those actions 
that are ascribable to our transcendentally free intelligible character, and responsible only 
for the contributions that our free character makes to those actions, this metaphysical 
account doesn’t help us pick out what are responsible for, since we decide what is 
ascribable to our intelligible character only by inferring the metaphysics from the 
ascription of responsibility.  So we need a different sort of reflection than the sort that Kant 
gives us in his transcendental idealism.  And this reflection can’t be metaphysical; Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason rules out the possibility of having theoretical insight into human 
freedom.  In this arena, we must go from practical reasoning to metaphysics, not vice 
versa.  So we need some better sort of practical reasoning. 
Here I’d like to make a conjecture that’s not particularly well grounded in Kant, 
though it has some resonance with his claim that we should “throw the veil of philanthropy 
over [others’] faults” (6:466)18 and had been prompted by my own reading of what Kant is 
                                                             
17 Alternatively, since nothing in nature is sufficiently determined in that one can always ask for further 
explanations of the further grounds for any causal laws governing any particular instance, we might say that 
everyone is wholly responsible for everything.  (“Granted, you stole the chicken because the chip in your 
brain overrode your decision and moved your body so that it picked up the chicken, but why was the chip in 
your brain able to do that?”) 
18 Incidentally, it’s worth noting that the context of this remark involves yet another warning by Kant against 
self-exculpatory behavior.  What he specifically condemns is taking “malicious pleasure in exposing the 
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up to in his Religion.19  I’d like to suggest a Kantian constructivist approach to degrees of 
responsibility. 20   Instead of taking judgments about degrees of responsibility to be 
grounded in some metaphysical truths about the world, let’s take them to be grounded in 
practices of holding responsible, practices that we construct in order to meet needs that 
arise within practical life together.  In this context, rather than simply taking for granted 
that they are “important” (Saunders, p. 1, 8) let’s ask “What do we need judgments about 
degrees of responsibility for?”  And again, recalling that we often use such judgments 
illegitimately, in order to excuse the bad behavior of ourselves or of those we particularly 
love, the real question is “What morally legitimate reasons do we have to make judgments 
about degrees of moral responsibility?” 21  So here’s a partial list of some prima facie 
legitimate reasons we might make judgments about degrees of responsibility: 
1. To determine whether and how much punishment is appropriate 
2. To determine how much praise or blame is due to a person 
3. To determine how much remorse or regret one should feel for a given action 
4. To decide whether forgiveness is appropriate in a given case.22 
5. To give oneself or another moral hope, a sense that X or Y misdeed does 
not preclude virtue altogether 
6. To promote effective moral cultivation in oneself or others 
For determining the appropriateness of punishment, blame, forgiveness, remorse, and 
hope, and for discerning the best ways of cultivating moral improvement, it can make a 
difference just how responsible one holds a person to be.  A young child will not deserve 
(as much) punishment and moral blame, and should not feel the same degree (or perhaps 
even kind) of remorse and regret.  Strictly speaking, it doesn’t make sense to “forgive” a 
child for a wrong for which they were not responsible.  And with very young children, 
promoting moral cultivation is not primarily a matter of getting them to commit to the right 
moral principles as it is a matter of cultivating their abilities of self-governance in general.  
By contrast, fully functional adults making decisions in the context of careful deliberation 
and with ample self-control are rightly held fully responsible, subject to punishment, 
blame, remorse, and so on. 
                                                             
19 The details of how this relates to the Religion are a topic for another paper. 
20 Or, perhaps, a post-Kantian constructivist approach.  In some ways, the basic outlines of this approach fit 
better with Hegel than Kant.  Cf. Pippin, 2008.  In other ways, it fits better with pragmatists, from James to 
Rorty and Brandom. 
21 Here, in particular, it’s important to recall that Kant’s ethics is primarily about deliberation about what to 
do, and it’s worth noting that consideration of degrees of responsibility is almost always illegitimate in such 
contexts; if I am asking, “How responsible am I for what I am about to do?”, then I’m in moral trouble.  This 
anticipatory self-exculpation is a form of radical evil, a way in which we corrupt our own principles of 
volition.  And it is a classic example of what Kant warns against in Perpetual Peace, a self-fulfilling negative 
prophecy, where precisely because I take myself not to be able to do anything but what’s wicked, I don’t do 
anything but what’s wicked. 
22 Here my thought is that forgiveness is not appropriate in cases where a person is not responsible for what 
they did, and only appropriate to some degree when a person is only responsible to some degree.  We can 
exculpate or set aside the bad deeds of someone who is not responsible, but we cannot forgive someone that 
we don’t hold responsible.  For discussion of related issues, I’m grateful to Lucy Allais.  
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 A full discussion of each of these different reasons for making judgments about 
degrees of responsibility would be far beyond the scope of this paper.  Here I just want to 
make a few short remarks about the practical reasons for such judgments and the 
metaphysical requirements for them.  Of the reasons listed above, by far the most 
prominent is the use of degrees of responsibility in legal contexts.  For Kant, however, 
legal punishment does not depend upon the moral condition of the criminal: “The concept 
of right … has to do … only with the external … practical relation of one person to 
another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have direct or indirect influence on each 
other” (6:230).  The only relevant question when it comes to punishment is whether a 
given punishment is “a hindrance to a hindrance to freedom,” (6:231), that is, whether the 
punishment functions to counteract an action that hinders legally permissible actions.  
There might be various reasons for taking into account exculpatory circumstances in 
determining legal sanctions for actions that are inconsistent with the freedom of everyone 
in accordance with a universal law” (6:232), but the relevant “degrees of responsibility” 
will not require any deep metaphysical underpinnings. 
 With respect to the other reasons for making judgments about degrees of 
responsibility, there is also no reason to think that such judgments require deep 
metaphysical commitments.  Kant makes clear in his Groundwork that “praise and 
encouragement” do not depend upon “true moral worth” (4:398).  Someone with good 
inclinations – for which nature, not one’s transcendentally free intelligible character, is 
responsible – nonetheless gets praise.  Whatever the reasons for doing this, they do not 
depend upon a metaphysical foundation.  So why praise or blame in the absence of 
knowledge of a person’s moral worth?  Praising others for virtues that they may or may not 
have can also serve a pedagogical role and a role in socially reinforcing virtue, both 
through clarification and endorsement of what sorts of actions are genuinely in accordance 
with the moral law and through enlisting supporting motives for virtuous action, such as 
the love of honor that Kant calls a “simulacrum of virtue” (2:218).    Praise of others can 
also help combat misanthropy and thereby promote genuine respect for others.  Blame, too, 
can serve some of these pedagogical roles by showing what sorts of actions are blame-
worthy and thus to be avoided and by enlisting the love of honor as a support for moral 
incentives, but excessive moral blame of others risks fostering misanthropy, which can 
promote disdain for others, self-righteousness, and/or moral despair, all of which inhibit 
one’s ability to treat others with respect.  Thus Kant recommends that “the veil of 
philanthropy” be thrown over others (6: 466), and ascribing to others a diminished degree 
of responsibility for their faults is one way to throw such a veil.   
Strikingly, almost none of these valuable functions of praise and blame actually 
depend upon metaphysically-grounded or even upon accurate ascriptions of degrees of 
responsibility.  When we praise someone for good behavior, what matters is how much we 
want to endorse and encourage that behavior, not how responsible they are.  And in the one 
case where degrees of responsibility do seem most helpful – the softening of our blame of 
others – Kant’s own recommendation is that we avoid the “offensive inquisitiveness” that 
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ourselves to judge that Manny or Hu is not really morally blameworthy because not wholly 
responsible, we should simply soften our anger towards them out of a recognition that such 
anger corrupts the respect we owe to them as people, and then refrain from making 
judgments about their fundamental moral convictions.  We should, in other words, judge 
people less, rather than trying to make more and more fine-grained judgments of just how 
responsible they are.23   
 With respect to ourselves, however, “the duty … is … to cultivate one’s 
conscience, to sharpen one’s attentiveness to the voice of the inner judge and to use every 
means to obtain a hearing for it” (6:402).  In one’s own case, we should not refrain from 
moral scrutiny.  Nonetheless, even here, there is little reason to insist upon degrees of 
responsibility.  If I have violated the moral law, I should feel regret and remorse, even if I 
was not wholly responsible.  Marcia Baron explains that “remorse…involves a judgment 
on the agent’s part that she acted wrongly and should and could have acted differently, … 
[and] the judgment is action-guiding; … It has motivational force” (Baron 1988: 259).  
One who feels remorse should reform his ways, and often should deal with relevant moral 
remainders.  If I betrayed your secret during a bout of frivolous gossiping, I owe you at 
least an apology, and I may need to take concrete steps to help mitigate the harm to you 
done by the betrayal.  If through careless neglect or deliberate malice I ruined a book that 
you lent me, I owe you a new book.  In both cases, I should feel remorse or regret for my 
bad actions and commit myself to not repeat them in the future.  What difference does it 
make how “responsible” I am for those bad actions?  On the one hand, suppose, in the 
most extreme case, that I am not responsible at all, that – to use Frankfurt’s wild scenario – 
a chip was implanted in my brain that made me do it.  I still ought not maliciously gossip 
or destroy books in the future (in cases where I do have self-control), and I ought to take 
steps to increase my self-control.  In those senses, I should feel regret.  Moreover, since, 
after all, you were still hurt, I should take steps to remedy your hurt.  On the other hand, 
supposing the opposite extreme, where I deliberately planned the revelation of the secret or 
destruction of the book, and I did so knowing that it was wrong, and just for the sheer 
sadistic pleasure of harming you, a pleasure that I used not to feel but a susceptibility for 
which I have deliberately cultivated because I concluded that it would be a particularly 
sweet pleasure and contribute well to my overall happiness.  In this case, I should feel 
                                                             
23 In private comments on an early draft of this paper, Saunders asks the seemingly reasonable question, 
“Why not both?”  In my view, however, the options are by and large mutually exclusive in actual practice.  
Generating fine-grained judgments of moral responsibility requires paying close attention to just what a 
person is and is not responsible for in a given case (usually a case of a given misdeed).  This requires 
spending more time judging the actions of others.  Correlatively, given the reality of human evil, those who 
spend a lot of time judging others typically end up either isolated and misanthropic or end up needing to 
absolve others through ascriptions of diminished responsibility.  Of course, there will likely be cases where 
there is good evidence that others are morally corrupt and we cannot help judging them in some way (as, 
perhaps, in the case of Manny?).  In those cases, beyond keeping our judgments as much as possible to 
ourselves (6:464), Kant exhorts us to adopt a posture of forgiveness rather than exculpation, for reasons I’ll 
briefly mention below.  When there is strong evidence of diminished responsibility, we can of course attend 
to such evidence (and §1 shows how empirical features could evidence such diminished responsibility), but 
we do better to refrain from judgment where possible. 
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remorse, I ought to commit myself not to engage in this behavior in the future, and I ought 
to provide you some recompense for the harm I’ve caused.24   
 I’ll deal with the last three reasons to use degrees of responsibility more quickly, 
although they really deserve the most extensive treatment.  Given that human beings are 
evil, and in that evil cause harm to one another, there is a serious danger of moral despair.  
Our relationships with others can seem irretrievably broken due to their evil actions 
towards us, and real hope in the moral goodness of ourselves and those we love can erode 
in the face of the “multitude of woeful examples” that experience “parades before us” 
(6:33).  Judgments about degrees of responsibility are, among other things, ways of coping 
with these broken relationships and moral despair.  By thinking that a person was not 
wholly responsible for an action, we can cut them some slack and hope for better times in 
the future.  As I explained in §1, there is room for this sort of exculpation of moral wrong 
in Kant’s metaphysics.  At the most extreme case, I can see my lover’s betrayal as 
something for which he is wholly non-responsible, a mere behavior motivated by affect.  
But I can also see it as mere frailty, perhaps in the fact of extraordinary circumstances, 
rather than depravity or impurity.  And so on.   
As appealing – and common – as it is to appeal to diminished responsibility in these cases, 
however, there are important reasons Kant does not turn to degrees of responsibility as his 
primary way of dealing with human evil. Kant thinks that he has an alternative account, a 
different way of restoring relationships and justifying moral hope.  Though he does not 
wholly work it out, Kant turns to “grace” and “forgiveness,” rather than lenient justice or 
degrees of responsibility.  We can and should accept that ourselves and others really are 
evil, but we also can and should accept that forgiveness is possible, that despite evil we can 
move forward.  Grace and forgiveness, whatever their problems, are more respectful of 
humans’ dignity and freedom than exculpation.  And when we are unsure, in a given case, 
how responsible a person is, forgiveness provides a way of moving forward from misdeeds 
that admits that whenever there is any responsibility, forgiveness can be justified.  A 
community within which people more readily forgive is one within which judgments about 
degrees of responsibility have much lower stakes.25 
                                                             
24 Leaving aside issues of legal right, degrees of responsibility don’t even change the kinds of obligations that 
I have in the light of harm to others.  However responsible I was, I have a perfect obligation not to repeat the 
bad actions and imperfect obligations to remedy the harms I have caused and to cultivate in myself the 
tendencies (self-control, sympathy, etc.) that will make it more likely in the future that I’ll behave well.  It 
may be that my indirect duties should carry more weight if I was more responsible for what I did, but I 
suspect that how responsibility affects subsequent responsibilities will vary considerably on a case-by-case 
basis.  Because Kant talks so little about moral (as opposed to legal) recompense, it’s hard to know precisely 
how he would deal with different sorts of obligations, but the basic structure of his moral theory suggests that 
the moral responsibility of the actor will be at best only an indirect factor.  What matters most fundamentally 
is the humanity of the persons principally affected, and the casuistical questions here are issues of how best 
to respect others’ (and one’s own) humanity in the context of violations of various kinds (where, for instance, 
the harm of missing a chicken is different than the harm of being undeservedly treated as an enemy by a 
neighbor).   
25 Note, again, that I am talking here about moral community, not legal community.  There may be good 
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 Finally, there is the issue of moral cultivation.  Here, too, degrees of responsibility 
play much less of a role than they initially seem.  There are quite complex issues about 
how moral cultivation can work at all in the context of transcendental idealism; I’ve 
discussed these in detail in Frierson, 2003.  But insofar as those issues can be resolved, 
what matters is what empirical influences provoke actions that conflict with the moral law.  
If one has a frail will, one needs to cultivate strength of will; if one is depraved, one needs 
to restructure the principles on the basis of which one chooses.  If one is primarily tempted 
by animalistic inclinations, one needs to work specifically on resisting those inclinations; if 
one is just generally inconstant in one’s behavior, one needs to work more generally on 
constancy.  And so on.  Some of these cases may involve different degrees of 
responsibility than others.  But the degrees of responsibility don’t affect how one would 
actually work for self-cultivation.  If one is afflicted by affects, and so not responsible at 
all, he still has a responsibility to rid himself of affects; if afflicted by a passion, and so 
deeply responsible, she still has a responsibility to rid herself of passion.  How one works 
against passion is quite different than how one works against affect, so it matters what the 
causes of our bad behavior are for how we work against them, but the fact that we have 
more responsibility in one case than another doesn’t affect our practical endeavors. 
 Overall, then, there are many uses of judgments of degrees of responsibility – 
particularly for self-exculpation – that are unnecessary or even dangerous.  In other cases, 
judgments about degrees of responsibility are second-best attempts to do what can be done 
better.  We can soften our judgments of others better by refraining from judgment, and we 
can deal with others’ misdeeds better through forgiveness, than through ascribing to them 
diminished responsibility.  Finally, there are judgments of degrees of responsibility that are 
perfectly appropriate but can be justified for pragmatic reasons that don’t require any 
profound metaphysical backing.   Even where degrees of responsibility are important, 
where some metaphysical backing is called for, Kant’s account of human beings is 
sufficient.  Human beings are radically evil but potentially in revolution against their evil, 
where such a revolution would constitute a human good will and show up empirically as a 
struggle against one’s own evil tendencies.  We give people more praise for actions that 
more clearly demonstrate this struggle against evil, and we partially excuse behavior that, 
in the context of the person’s life as a whole, provides evidence more of universal human 
propensities to evil than of a failure to struggle against those propensities.  The proper 
judgments here will more often be qualitative than quantitative, primarily judgments about 
kinds of responsibility and secondarily (if at all) about “degrees.”   These judgments will 
also be imperfect, both because empirical evidence of what happened is imperfect and 
because we can only imperfectly infer fundamental (noumenal) moral character from the 
empirical expressions of that character.  Kant’s transcendental idealism thus provides a 
metaphysical picture consistent with different kinds and degrees of responsibility, while his 
epistemology and practical philosophy set realistic limits on what we can judge about 
others and on how much (and how) we should judge them. 
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